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Abstract
The current policy agenda of neoclassical macroeconomics, as expressed within conserva-
tive political circles in the United Kingdom and European Union, is that fiscal contraction
is the lever that can bring about recovery from the current economic downturn. Allegedly,
the reason is that when business sees that the government balance sheet is improving - and
public debt declining - there will be greater confidence in the country’s economic prospects
and this increased confidence will lead to higher investment. This in turn will lead to growth
and the road to economic recovery. This study examines the impact of government stance
on public debt for eleven OECD countries for which data on the relevant factors are avail-
able from 1881 to 2011. Contrary to traditional predictions, it turns out that over this
long historical span, fiscal contractions deteriorated rather than improved public debt as a
percentage of GDP. This implies that fiscal austerity exacerbates the lack of demand and
deteriorates rather than enhances the prospects of economic recovery.
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1 Introduction
Deficit reduction is not an end in itself. Its importance lies in improving productivity, real
wages and living standards. If fiscal contraction actually reduces a nation’s output, diminishes
demand and raises unemployment, then deficit reduction is not capable of advancing the aim of
increasing economic prosperity. Recent policies of pursuing harsh austerity, often under duress
and despite high unemployment, have frequently led to countries being unable to service their
debts, forcing further cuts in public spending and tax increases to be introduced, while public debt
as a percentage of output continues to worsen. Ordinarily, this outcome is not entirely surprising.
Recessions are caused by demand deficiency - a level of demand below that which an economy
is potentially able to produce. Fiscal contraction causes a reduction in spending that further
lowers demand. In turn, this causes a further reduction in the production of goods and services
as businesses cut production to the level of effective demand and hence further reduction in the
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). Nevertheless, the proponents of austerity argue that, just
as households sooner or later have to live within their means, thus national governments should
likewise curtail spending to match tax revenues. They argue that austerity policies promote
confidence within business that the government is determined to, and has the capability to,
live within its means. It is suggested that increased confidence increases investment spending
which in turn more than compensates for the contractionary effects of the initial decrease in
government spending. This line of argument recently came to prominence in work by Alesina and
Ardagna (1998, 2010), who claimed that they uncovered strong evidence of contractionary fiscal
policy having positive confidence effects on economic expansion and strong historical evidence of
expansionary fiscal austerity.
In contrast, Callegari et al. (2012) show that fiscal contraction and, in particular, cuts to
public expenditure, can prolong recessions without generating the expected fiscal saving. They
also argue that reductions in public spending have strong effects on consumption. Fiscal austerity
during a recession seems to aggravate the costs of fiscal adjustment and the slow the reduction
in the debt-to-GDP ratio. This in turn can aggravate weak market sentiment at times of low
confidence, undermining the fiscal austerity efforts altogether.
This argument is supported by Chick and Pettifor (2011), who contrast the fiscal consol-
idations of pre-war Britain during which the public debt ratio increased and macroeconomic
conditions worsened, with the post-war fiscal expansion during which the debt ratio falls and the
economy prospered. In periods of recession, increases in public investment generate a multiplier
effect, boosting incomes as well as tax revenue, increasing private sector activity, and reducing
debt servicing costs and benefit payments. To paraphrase Keynes, “expenditure creates its own
income”.
Pasinetti (1989) and Dalziel (1991) examine the relationship between the distribution of
income and the method of government finance following Kaldor (1956), and confirm that both
Kaldor’s theory of income distribution and the Cambridge theory of the rate of profits are robust
to a range of methods of financing budget deficits. However, Pollin (2012) gives some alternative
arguments to the normal Ricardian equivalence hypothesis why expansionary fiscal policy in the
US during the 2008 financial crisis might not have the results expected - reliance on tax cuts,
reduction in household wealth holding back consumption, and credit markets being locked up.
Moreover, Stockhammer (2013) argues inequality has been the root cause of the recent economic
crisis, driving down aggregate demand, partly due to the poor having relatively high marginal
propensities to consume, and partly due to a falling wage share. Crotty (2012) argues that
conservative macroeconomics, together with a focus on austerity, generates slow growth, rising
inequality and rising deficits, and in turn, demands for further austerity. Taylor et al. (2012) gives
a parallel exposition of the theoretical underpinnings of this paper - showing a policy induced
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expansion in the deficit would increase growth and reduce the debt-output ratio in the long run.
Finally, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) emphasise that there is no consistent evidence justifying
the use of contractionary fiscal policy to secure economic growth. Fiscal adjustment in response
to elevated levels of government debt and future pressures on public finances is only one of
many possible factors that need to be considered in determining the appropriate pace of fiscal
consolidation for any country.
This brief literature review shows that there is not only a paucity of consistency of the
effects of fiscal austerity on economic growth and prosperity but also ambiguous effects on the
debt-to-GDP ratios across counties. This paper aims to further investigate the effects of fiscal
contraction on national debt and economic activity. It attempts to disentangle the transitory and
permanent effects of fiscal austerity on debt-to-GDP ratio using a panel of eleven OECD countries
for which data on the relevant factors are available from 1881 to 2011. Contrary to traditional
predictions, it turns out that over this long historical span, fiscal contractions deteriorated rather
than improved public debt as a percentage of GDP. This implies that fiscal austerity exacerbates
the lack of demand and deteriorates rather than enhances the prospects of economic recovery.
Furthermore, the paper examines the hidden cost of fiscal austerity - the waste of valuable human
resources - by examining the relationship between the primary deficit ratio and the change in
the unemployment rate. The results indicate a robust inverse relationship suggesting that cuts
to government expenditure increases unemployment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly sets up the theoretical relationships to
be confronted with the historical record. Section 3 describes the data that has been employed in
this study. In Section 4 the methodology to be used in the empirical analysis is outlined. Section
5 contains a discussion of the empirical results. In section 6 extensions to the analysis to capture
the welfare loss from austerity are examined. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
The theoretical starting point is the standard debt accumulation identity describing debt accu-
mulation being attributable to the sum of the the effect of the addition to the stock of debt
resulting from an excess of government spending over tax revenues (the primary deficit) plus the
debt servicing obligation on the existing stock of debt.
∆D ≡ (G− T ) + iD (1)
where D is real debt, (G − T ) is the real primary deficit, and i is the real interest rate on
public debt. By dividing through by real GDP, Y and defining d ≡ D/Y , g ≡ G/Y , t ≡ T/Y
and y ≡ ∆Y/Y equation (1) can be written as
∆d = (g − t) + (i− y)d (2)
where d is the real debt ratio (the ratio of debt to GDP), (g − t) is the ratio of real primary
deficit to GDP, and y is the GDP growth rate 1. An estimatable form of equation (2) would be
∆d = b0 + b1f + b2i− b3y (3)
where f ≡ (g − t) is the real primary deficit ratio. The debt servicing components b2i− b3y
may be considered to capture the long run effect of debt accumulation and economic growth.
Equations 1 and 2 are in line with similar formulations for the evolution of govern-
ment debt in studies by Hall and Sargent (2011), Mason and Jayadev (2014) and
1Since d ≡ D/Y , D = dY , and hence ∆D = Y ∆d + d∆Y and thus ∆D/Y = ∆d + d∆Y/Y = ∆d + dy.
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DeGrauwe and Ji (2013). This literature is mainly concerned to show how GDP
growth, inflation and interest rates affect the evolution of the debt ratio and the
household debt ratio (Hall and Sargent, 2011; Aizenman and Marion, 2009; Buiter,
1985; Das, 2011; Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2003; Giannitsarou and Scott, 2008;
Abbas et al., 2011) in contrast to this study which focuses on the effects of govern-
ment stance on the public debt.
3 Data
The data in this paper comprises a panel of 11 OECD countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US. Data is annual
and spans the period 1881-2011. Data on the real GDP growth rate, real debt ratio, real primary
deficit ratio and real interest rate on public debt are from Mauro et al. (2013), and data on the
unemployment rate is a constructed time series derived from published OECD data combined
with data obtained from the US Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Galenson
and Zellner (1957). A common problem with long data series is that some data points are missing,
particularly during the first and second world wars. In such cases data points are generated by
linear interpolation (Intriligator, 1978), and for the period of the first and second world wars,
two dummy variables are introduced.
4 Methodology
In terms of the econometric approach a standard fixed effects regression model is estimated that
has the form
djt = αt +Xjtβ + Ejtγ + Sj + jt (4)
where for country j and year t, d is the change in the real debt ratio, X is a vector of
other controls, E is a measure of real primary deficit ratio, S is a fixed effect control for the
time-invariant state-specific impacts on the real primary deficit ratio, and  is an error term.
Unfortunately, a-priori there is no theory to guide researchers as to the length or the shape of
the lag structure that is appropriate to capture any lagged effects of the deficit ratio on the debt
ratio, and therefore, there is no a consensus on how to model these dynamic effects. One way
to circumvent this issue of lags is to make a distinction between the permanent and transitory
components of the real primary deficit on national debt. This concept is similar to the formulation
for income and consumption by Friedman (1957) and employs the standard permanent-transitory
decomposition using the Mundlak (1978) methodology. This methodology uses a random effects
estimator. However, in Mundlak’s specification the potential correlation between unobservable
characteristics and, here, the real primary deficit ratio, is accounted for and it is often interpreted
as a bridge between the two estimators (Greene, 2008)(pp. 209-10). Thus, the advantage of using
the Mundlak methodology is its ability to identify the ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ effects of the
real primary deficit on national debt, in contrast to earlier literature (Hall and Sargent,
2011; Mason and Jayadev, 2014; Aizenman and Marion, 2009; Buiter, 1985; Das,
2011; Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2003; Giannitsarou and Scott, 2008; Abbas et al.,
2011; DeGrauwe and Ji, 2013) which is mainly concerned of how GDP growth,
inflation and interest rates determine the evolution of the debt ratio.
Thus, following Mundlak (1978) the effect, Sj , is assumed to be a random effect disturbance
term and the real primary deficit ratio and other important variables are allowed to have both a
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transitory and permanent (fixed) effect. Hence, instead of estimating equation (4), the following
specification is estimated:
Hjt = αt +Xjtβ + Ejtγ + Ijtδ + E¯j γ˜ + I¯j δ˜ + jt + (Sj − E(Sj |Xj , Ej , Ij)) (5)
Hjt = αt +Xjtβ + Ejtγ + Ijtδ + E¯j γ˜ + I¯j δ˜ + jt + ut (6)
where I are other important variables, and E¯ and I¯ are the mean levels of real primary deficit
and other important variables, respectively, for each state j and E(sj |Xj , Ej , Ij) = E¯j γ˜ + I¯j δ˜.
Greene (2008) argues that the above formulation retains the random effects specification but
should also appropriately deal with the problem of any correlation between the unobserved
effects (Sj) and the regressors. The above procedure introduces dynamics on the effects of the
real primary deficit ratio and other important variables on national debt. To fully identify the
transitory and permanent effects, the variable transformation suggested by Ferrer-i Carbonell
and van Praag (2002) is used which, in this context, redefines the term Ejtγ + E¯j γ˜ in equation
(6) to (Ejt−E¯j)γ+E¯j(γ+γ˜) and redefine Ijtδ+I¯j δ˜ to (Ijt−I¯j)δ+I¯j(δ+δ˜). This allows an explicit
decomposition of the impact of real primary deficit and other important variables on national
debt into two distinct effects. Differences across countries in the average real primary deficit and
other important variables measure the permanent effects and the deviations from the average
real primary deficit, (Ejt − E¯j), and other important variables (Ijt − I¯j), per state, measure the
transitory effects. The coefficients, γ and δ, reflect transitory effects and the coefficients (γ + γ˜)
and (δ+ δ˜) measure permanent effects. Note that since the ‘transitory’ effects are parameterised
as differences in the real primary deficit ratio, the relative importance of the real primary deficit
ratio on national debt in both a short-term and a long-term effect can be assessed. If these effects
point in different directions, then their relative importance can be evaluated.
In addition, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2002) demonstrate using Monte Carlo simulations that
the Mundlak model can be viewed as an approximation of a general dynamic autoregressive
distributed lag model. They also show that the Mundlak model is a perfect representation of a
model with lagged exogenous variables and the unspecified lag dynamics is fully compensated by
the inclusion of the group mean as a control. In addition, they demonstrate that the Mundlak
model provides an approximation of the temporary and permanent effects, when inference in a
dynamic model is not feasible. This interpretation is widely used in the literature. For instance
van Praag et al. (2003) and Gottschalk et al. (1994) apply this concept in a micro panel context
and Afonso et al. (2011) in a macro panel context and use a similar interpretation of the Mundlak
decomposition.
It is worth emphasising that the Mundlak methodology offers an economically interpretable
fixed effect, since changes in this ‘fixed effect’ correspond to changes in average real primary
deficit. For standard fixed effects, in general one cannot give an economic interpretation of the
fixed effect. Although the Mundlak specification provides a convenient avenue for identifying the
permanent and transitory effects of the variables of interest, a potential problem may be that
these variables may be correlated with the state-level random effect, uj . This may cause the
estimates in Table 1 to be biased due to endogeneity in the relationship. To address this issue,
this paper employs the Hausman and Taylor (1981) (HT) correction. The HT procedure can be
used to deal with the problem of endogeneity and test whether the results in Table 1 are robust to
endogeneity correction. The HT procedure is an instrumental variables estimator that controls
for any correlation between the independent variables and the random effect. Starting with
equation (5) above, both the transitory and permanent real primary deficit ratio are assumed to
be correlated with the state random effect. The other time varying and time invariant variables
are assumed exogenous. A within- or fixed-effects estimator of that equation removes the time
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invariant covariates. Using the estimates from that regression, the within-residuals are then
calculated. These residuals are then used as the dependent variable in a regression including
the time invariant regressors using the time varying variables as instruments. This procedure
produces consistent estimates of all of the coefficients in equation (5).
5 Results
The discussion of results is divided into two subsections. First, the main results are discussed
detailing the impact of the primary deficit ratio on the change in the debt ratio. In the sec-
ond subsection the transitory-permanent dichotomy of the deficit ratio - debt relationship is
considered.
5.1 The effect of change on real primary deficit on the change in debt:
basic results
One issue of concern is the possibility that the Mundlak random effects estimation does not
produce results in line with the fixed effects estimation. To investigate this, the results of
the fixed and random effects estimation are similar and compatible for the same period. In this
subsection the results of the fixed and random effects estimation are compared. Table 1 column 1
reports the results of the fixed effects estimation of equation (4) including in X only two dummy
variables for the effects of World War I and II. The results show a negative and statistically
significant relationship between the primary government deficit ratio (f) and the change in the
debt ratio ∆d. Thus, from column 1 of Table 1 it can be seen that a rise in the real primary
deficit ratio f by 1% reduces the change in the debt ratio by 0.76%. Interestingly, the results of
the fixed effects estimation are very similar to the random effects estimation. This suggests that
the effects of the primary government deficit ratio on the change in the debt ratio are robust to
the estimation methodology.
In table 1, column 2 the random effects regressions reveal a consistent negative relationship
in the neighborhood of previous estimates. Hence, increases in government expenditure reduce
the national debt. A rise in the real primary deficit ratio f by 1% reduces the change in the debt
ratio by 0.73%.
These results show a consistency and robustness between the fixed and random effects es-
timations. The results are contrary to prior expectations arising from a cursory appeal to the
standard stock-flow notion which states that the stock of debt is augmented by the flows of
excesses of government spending over tax revenues. However, historical data reveals long peri-
ods where primary deficits are increasing but debt ratios are falling. This paper confirms this
inverse relationship identified by Chick and Pettifor (2011) who contrast the fiscal consolidations
of pre-war Britain during which the public debt ratio increased and macroeconomic conditions
worsened, with the post-war fiscal expansion during which the debt ratio falls and the economy
prospered. In periods of recession, increases in public investment generate a multiplier effect,
boosting incomes as well as tax revenue, increasing private sector activity, and reducing debt
servicing costs and benefit payments.
A further pair of estimations augments the above estimations by including in X other im-
portant determinants of the national debt as indicated by equation (4): the real GDP growth
rate, real interest rate on government debt and the real primary debt ratio. The latter variable
controls for the state of national finances of the country. Table 1, columns 3 and 4 shows the
fixed and random effects respectively. It can be seen that a 1% rise in the real primary deficit
ratio f reduces the change in the debt ratio by 0.96% in the fixed effects estimation and 0.93% in
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the random effects estimation. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to the earlier results,
and once again show a consistency and robustness between the fixed and random effects estima-
tions. The first step is to examine whether the results confirm the expected long run results of
an inverse relationship between national debt and economic growth and a positive relationship
between national debt and the cost of debt repayment. Interestingly, the coefficient on (i − y)
in equation (2) would be, taking specification (4) as an example, 0.260 − 0.493 < 0 implying
a stable steady state with a positive debt (Pasinetti, 1989). One issue of concern is that
the above results are derived for the long historical period 1881 to 2011 and do not
make specific reference to the effects of the primary balance debt ratio during re-
cessions. Nevertheless, a part of the policy discussion focuses on the effects of fiscal
policy during recession2. The difficulty in addressing this issue is to identify specific
common recessionary periods given the business cycles for the countries included
in this study are not synchronised. However, two recessionary shocks, the Great
Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession post 2008-2009 are reasonably well
synchronised. Thus, following DeGrauwe and Ji (2013), the above estimations are
replicated for two periods: 1930-1932, and 2010-2011. Table 2 shows the results
of this exercise. They confirm that there is a strong and significant negative effect
of the real primary deficit ratio on the change in debt confirming that increases in
government spending decrease the the national debt.
5.2 The transitory-permanent dichotomy of the deficit ratio - debt
relationship
An issue of concern is the importance of lagged effects of the real primary deficit on national
debt. If the impact of the real primary deficit is cumulative, then the effects of an increase
in the real primary deficit on national debt may be observed for many years after the original
increase. Hence, the effect of the real primary deficit ratio on national debt may take a long time
to manifest itself, and one would not expect the only effect of real primary deficit on national
debt to be of the contemporaneous nature modeled above.
The transitory-permanent dichotomy of the deficit ratio - debt relationship is considered,
using equation (6). The results of this exercise are reported in columns 5 and 6 in Table 1.
Specification (5) shows the simple Mundlak specification which decomposes the effects into a
permanent and a transitory component for the key independent variable: the real primary deficit
ratio. Specification (6) shows the full Mundlak specification which includes both the transitory
and the permanent effects of all the independent variables. The consistent negative relationship
between the real primary deficit ratio and the change in the debt ratio is maintained and is in
the neighborhood of previous estimates. For example, from columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 it can
be seen that a rise in the real primary deficit ratio f by 1% reduces the change in the debt
ratio by 0.95% (simple Mundlak specification) and, again, 0.95% (full Mundlak specification).
It can be confirmed that there is little difference in the results between the important variables
the two specifications. This shows that the relationship found in the ‘within’ estimator are also
found in the ‘between’ estimators implied by the random effects regression. The results highlight
that there are no statistically significant permanent effects. This evidence offers support for a
Keynesian approach to policymaking during economic downturns.
Finally in this section the results of the Hausman and Taylor (HT) correction are presented
to control for the possibility that the variables of interest may be correlated with the state-level
random effect. The results of this exercise are reported in column 7 in Table 1. The estimation
results show that there is little difference between the real primary deficit and the other important
2We are grateful to an anonymous referee of the journal for this point.
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variables compared with previous specifications. For example, in specification (7), a rise in the
real primary deficit ratio f by 1% reduces the change in the debt ratio by 0.94%. The coefficient
on (i− y) is 0.258− 0.496 < 0 again implying a stable steady state with a positive debt.
Overall, the empirical investigation above shows that the effects of government deficit spend-
ing is associated with reductions in the debt ratio. Austerity causes rather than alleviates the
debt burden. The next section investigates how austerity not only does not improve economic
performance but also imposes a major human cost on society.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆d (1930-32) ∆d (1930-32) ∆d (2010-11) ∆d (2010-11)
Real primary deficit ratio (f) -0.811*** -0.835*** -1.915* -1.091*
(0.198) (0.171) (1.017) (0.661)
Real interest rate on government debt (i) 1.920*** 0.375
(0.730) (0.476)
Real GDP growth rate (y) -0.720 -1.569***
(0.544) (0.360)
Constant 3.153** 1.326 14.25*** 4.055
(1.534) (2.026) (3.411) (5.331)
Observations 30 30 45 33
Number of countries 15 15 15 11
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Supplementary results - periods of recession
6 Extensions: the welfare loss of austerity
A macroeconomic outcome of crucial importance in determining the prevalence of poverty is
unemployment. As unemployment increases, more and more workers are not able to adequately
provide for themselves and their families, and poverty increases. The overall unemployment
rate gives an indication of the opportunity to work and hence should be expected to be an
important determinant of poverty. Changes in the unemployment rate in turn may be affected
by the fiscal stance of the government. In the previous two subsections, it has been established
that cutting the real primary deficit ratio actually worsens the debt ratio. However, in addition
to being ineffective in debt reduction, cutting the primary deficit also has the potential for
incurring a human cost, most potently, unemployment. Stockhammer and Kla¨r (2011) look at
the relationship between unemployment and capital accumulation and the real interest rate 3.
They argue that unemployment policy should focus on stimulating capital accumulation rather
than labour market reform. This view is supported by Chick and Pettifor (2011) who show that
the post-war policy stance in the UK lasting through to the 1970s resulted in a steady reduction
in unemployment and a period of steady growth and recovery of GDP. Moreover, they show
that public debt as a proportion of GDP fell throughout this period. They conclude that fiscal
policy focussed on employment and economic expansion was successful in delivering prosperity
and employment. This section therefore investigates the impact of reductions in real primary
deficit ratio on unemployment. The equation to be estimated is along the lines of the earlier
specification as follows:
∆u = b0 + b1f + b2i− b3y + b4d (7)
Due to data limitations, the data set is restricted to the period 1922-2010 and a subset of 9
OECD countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the
UK and the US.
3Stockhammer and Kla¨r (2011) also motivates the inclusion of the interest rate and the growth rate of GDP
in this paper.
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The results are presented in Table (3) in the same format as in the previous section. The
parsimonious specifications (1) and (2) show the fixed and random effects estimations with the
real primary deficit ratio (f) as the sole explanatory variable, whereas specifications (3) and
(4) show the fixed and random effects estimations with the other key explanatory variables
included. The estimates are consistent and robust, with a 1% rise in the primary deficit ratio f
being associated with around a 0.06% fall in the rate of change of the unemployment rate ∆u.
Specification (5) shows the simple Mundlak correction which includes the permanent effect
of the key independent variable: the real primary deficit ratio f¯ . Specification (6) shows the
full Mundlak correction which includes the permanent effects of all the independent variables.
The consistent negative relationship between the real primary deficit ratio and the change of the
unemployment rate is maintained and is in the neighborhood of previous estimates. For example,
in the full specification (6), a 1% rise in the primary deficit ratio f is associated with a 0.06%
fall in the rate of change of the unemployment rate ∆u.
Finally, the results of the Hausman and Taylor (HT) correction are presented to control for
the possibility that the variables of interest may be correlated with the state-level random effect.
The results of this exercise are reported in column 7 in table 3. The results show that there
is little difference between the real primary deficit and the other important variables compared
with previous specifications. For example, in specification (7), a a 1% rise in the primary deficit
ratio f is associated with a 0.06% fall in the rate of change of the unemployment rate ∆u.
The results in table (3) thus show a robust inverse relationship between the real primary deficit
ratio (f) and the change in the unemployment rate ∆u. All in all, increases in government
expenditure reduce unemployment. Thus, policies of fiscal austerity in additional to having
harmful effects on debt ratios, they also have additional social costs in increasing unemployment
and wasting human and productive potential.
Column 7 of table 3 shows the results after controlling for endogeneity. Although the tran-
sitory effects remain strong and significant, the permanent effects turn out to be insignificant.
These results imply that contractionary fiscal policy has an immediate an important effects on
unemployment with the consequent detrimental effects of skills deterioration on human capital
and wellbeing of the population.
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7 Discussion and conclusions
Historical data has identified long periods during which primary deficits are increasing but debt
ratios are falling. This seems to be at odds with the standard stock-flow notion that the stock
of debt is augmented by the flows of excesses of government spending over tax revenues. This
paper has sought to investigate this puzzle and shed light on the effect of the primary government
deficit on national debt.
Employing annual data that spans the period 1881-2011 for a panel of 11 OECD countries, an
inverse relationship between the primary government deficit and national debt is found. Increases
in government expenditure reduce the national debt. Conversely fiscal austerity turns out to
increase the national debt. Furthermore cuts in government expenditure appear to not only to
have transitory effects in increasing the national debt but also have significant permanent effects
in worsening the public debt. Thus, fiscal austerity leads to worsening public debt. Furthermore
a secondary effect of fiscal austerity is the important and negative impact on employment levels.
The paper shows that fiscal austerity has at least significant transitory effects on increasing
unemployment.
Taken together these results should cast some doubts on the merits of reducing public spend-
ing during periods of recession. Policies aimed at reducing the primary deficit would seem to
actually worsen the debt ratio and increase unemployment.
The policy implications are profound, and controversial. The results imply that in periods
of recession, far from pursuing an aggressive programme of austerity aimed at cutting the gov-
ernment deficit and involving substantial cuts to government spending, policy makers should be
increasing public spending. If such spending is focussed on investment, rather than transfer pay-
ments (which are excluded from the measures of the government deficit used in this paper), then
this can not only stimulate demand and employment in the short term, when it is sorely needed,
but also expands capacity for the long term, mitigating problems of lack of supply capacity when
the economy moves out of recession. These conclusions are at odds with the received wisdom of
current political thinking, the media, and much of the academic literature, that promotes the
notion of small government and appeal to a simple, but misleading, stock-flow idea that the stock
of debt can be reduced by cuts to government spending. The findings of this paper supports the
main thrust of Chick and Pettifor (2011) in face of the battery of attacks in the Economic Journal
newsletter. Booth and Shackleton (2011) and Howells (2010) criticise the use of data averaged
over multi-year periods, whereas Harrison (2011) proposes the use of the second difference of
the debt ratio as the independent variable and varying the lag structure on the right hand side.
This paper exploits annual data over a long span, and a employ robust theoretical specification
to determine the estimatable equation. The results show a consistency and robustness between
fixed and random effects estimations. The importance of lagged effects is acknowledged, using
the Mundlak approach to explicitly consider the transitory-permanent dichotomy of the deficit
ratio - debt relationship and Hausman and Taylor to account for the effects of endogeneity in
the relationship. The results reveal that there is a positive and statistically significant transitory
effect between the real debt ratio and the change in the debt ratio but no statistically signifi-
cant permanent effects. Thus the results support the initial insights by Chick and Pettifor (2011)
and, importantly, and lend substantial support for a Keynesian approach to policymaking during
economic downturns.
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